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1338 lines
60 KiB
1338 lines
60 KiB
// This file was extracted from the TCG Published |
|
// Trusted Platform Module Library |
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// Part 4: Supporting Routines |
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// Family "2.0" |
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// Level 00 Revision 01.16 |
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// October 30, 2014 |
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|
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#include "InternalRoutines.h" |
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#include "Object_spt_fp.h" |
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#include "Platform.h" |
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// |
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// |
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// |
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// Local Functions |
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// |
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// EqualCryptSet() |
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// |
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// Check if the crypto sets in two public areas are equal |
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// |
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// Error Returns Meaning |
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// |
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// TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC mismatched parameters |
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// TPM_RC_HASH mismatched name algorithm |
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// TPM_RC_TYPE mismatched type |
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// |
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static TPM_RC |
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EqualCryptSet( |
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TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea1, // IN: public area 1 |
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TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea2 // IN: public area 2 |
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) |
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{ |
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UINT16 size1; |
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UINT16 size2; |
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BYTE params1[sizeof(TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS)]; |
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BYTE params2[sizeof(TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS)]; |
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BYTE *buffer; |
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INT32 bufferSize; |
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// Compare name hash |
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if(publicArea1->nameAlg != publicArea2->nameAlg) |
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return TPM_RC_HASH; |
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// Compare algorithm |
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if(publicArea1->type != publicArea2->type) |
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return TPM_RC_TYPE; |
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// TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS field should be identical |
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buffer = params1; |
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bufferSize = sizeof(TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS); |
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size1 = TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS_Marshal(&publicArea1->parameters, &buffer, |
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&bufferSize, publicArea1->type); |
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buffer = params2; |
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bufferSize = sizeof(TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS); |
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size2 = TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS_Marshal(&publicArea2->parameters, &buffer, |
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&bufferSize, publicArea2->type); |
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if(size1 != size2 || !MemoryEqual(params1, params2, size1)) |
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return TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC; |
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return TPM_RC_SUCCESS; |
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} |
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// |
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// |
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// GetIV2BSize() |
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// |
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// Get the size of TPM2B_IV in canonical form that will be append to the start of the sensitive data. It |
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// includes both size of size field and size of iv data |
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// |
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// Return Value Meaning |
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// |
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static UINT16 |
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GetIV2BSize( |
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TPM_HANDLE protectorHandle // IN: the protector handle |
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) |
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{ |
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OBJECT *protector = NULL; // Pointer to the protector object |
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TPM_ALG_ID symAlg; |
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// |
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UINT16 keyBits; |
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// Determine the symmetric algorithm and size of key |
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if(protectorHandle == TPM_RH_NULL) |
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{ |
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// Use the context encryption algorithm and key size |
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symAlg = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG; |
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keyBits = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS; |
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} |
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else |
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{ |
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protector = ObjectGet(protectorHandle); |
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symAlg = protector->publicArea.parameters.asymDetail.symmetric.algorithm; |
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keyBits= protector->publicArea.parameters.asymDetail.symmetric.keyBits.sym; |
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} |
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// The IV size is a UINT16 size field plus the block size of the symmetric |
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// algorithm |
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return sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(symAlg, keyBits); |
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} |
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// |
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// |
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// ComputeProtectionKeyParms() |
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// |
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// This function retrieves the symmetric protection key parameters for the sensitive data The parameters |
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// retrieved from this function include encryption algorithm, key size in bit, and a TPM2B_SYM_KEY |
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// containing the key material as well as the key size in bytes This function is used for any action that |
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// requires encrypting or decrypting of the sensitive area of an object or a credential blob |
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// |
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static void |
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ComputeProtectionKeyParms( |
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TPM_HANDLE protectorHandle, // IN: the protector handle |
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TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for KDFa |
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TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: name of the object |
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TPM2B_SEED *seedIn, // IN: optional seed for duplication blob. |
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// For non duplication blob, this |
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// parameter should be NULL |
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TPM_ALG_ID *symAlg, // OUT: the symmetric algorithm |
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UINT16 *keyBits, // OUT: the symmetric key size in bits |
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TPM2B_SYM_KEY *symKey // OUT: the symmetric key |
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) |
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{ |
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TPM2B_SEED *seed = NULL; |
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OBJECT *protector = NULL; // Pointer to the protector |
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// Determine the algorithms for the KDF and the encryption/decryption |
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// For TPM_RH_NULL, using context settings |
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if(protectorHandle == TPM_RH_NULL) |
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{ |
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// Use the context encryption algorithm and key size |
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*symAlg = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG; |
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symKey->t.size = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BYTES; |
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*keyBits = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS; |
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} |
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else |
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{ |
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TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *symDef; |
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protector = ObjectGet(protectorHandle); |
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symDef = &protector->publicArea.parameters.asymDetail.symmetric; |
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*symAlg = symDef->algorithm; |
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*keyBits= symDef->keyBits.sym; |
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symKey->t.size = (*keyBits + 7) / 8; |
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} |
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// Get seed for KDF |
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seed = GetSeedForKDF(protectorHandle, seedIn); |
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// KDFa to generate symmetric key and IV value |
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KDFa(hashAlg, (TPM2B *)seed, "STORAGE", (TPM2B *)name, NULL, |
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symKey->t.size * 8, symKey->t.buffer, NULL); |
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return; |
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} |
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// |
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// |
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// ComputeOuterIntegrity() |
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// |
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// The sensitive area parameter is a buffer that holds a space for the integrity value and the marshaled |
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// sensitive area. The caller should skip over the area set aside for the integrity value and compute the hash |
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// of the remainder of the object. The size field of sensitive is in unmarshaled form and the sensitive area |
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// contents is an array of bytes. |
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// |
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static void |
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ComputeOuterIntegrity( |
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TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
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TPM_HANDLE protectorHandle, // IN: The handle of the object that |
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// provides protection. For object, it |
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// is parent handle. For credential, it |
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// is the handle of encrypt object. For |
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// a Temporary Object, it is TPM_RH_NULL |
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TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: algorithm to use for integrity |
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TPM2B_SEED *seedIn, // IN: an external seed may be provided for |
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// duplication blob. For non duplication |
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// blob, this parameter should be NULL |
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UINT32 sensitiveSize, // IN: size of the marshaled sensitive data |
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BYTE *sensitiveData, // IN: sensitive area |
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TPM2B_DIGEST *integrity // OUT: integrity |
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) |
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{ |
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HMAC_STATE hmacState; |
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TPM2B_DIGEST hmacKey; |
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TPM2B_SEED *seed = NULL; |
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// Get seed for KDF |
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seed = GetSeedForKDF(protectorHandle, seedIn); |
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// Determine the HMAC key bits |
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hmacKey.t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg); |
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// KDFa to generate HMAC key |
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KDFa(hashAlg, (TPM2B *)seed, "INTEGRITY", NULL, NULL, |
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hmacKey.t.size * 8, hmacKey.t.buffer, NULL); |
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// Start HMAC and get the size of the digest which will become the integrity |
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integrity->t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(hashAlg, &hmacKey.b, &hmacState); |
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// Adding the marshaled sensitive area to the integrity value |
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CryptUpdateDigest(&hmacState, sensitiveSize, sensitiveData); |
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// Adding name |
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CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, (TPM2B *)name); |
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// Compute HMAC |
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CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &integrity->b); |
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return; |
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} |
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// |
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// |
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// ComputeInnerIntegrity() |
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// |
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// This function computes the integrity of an inner wrap |
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// |
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static void |
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ComputeInnerIntegrity( |
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TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for inner wrap |
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TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
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UINT16 dataSize, // IN: the size of sensitive data |
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BYTE *sensitiveData, // IN: sensitive data |
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TPM2B_DIGEST *integrity // OUT: inner integrity |
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) |
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{ |
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HASH_STATE hashState; |
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// Start hash and get the size of the digest which will become the integrity |
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integrity->t.size = CryptStartHash(hashAlg, &hashState); |
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// Adding the marshaled sensitive area to the integrity value |
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CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, dataSize, sensitiveData); |
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// Adding name |
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CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &name->b); |
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// Compute hash |
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CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &integrity->b); |
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return; |
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} |
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// |
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// |
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// ProduceInnerIntegrity() |
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// |
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// This function produces an inner integrity for regular private, credential or duplication blob It requires the |
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// sensitive data being marshaled to the innerBuffer, with the leading bytes reserved for integrity hash. It |
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// assume the sensitive data starts at address (innerBuffer + integrity size). This function integrity at the |
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// beginning of the inner buffer It returns the total size of buffer with the inner wrap |
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// |
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static UINT16 |
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ProduceInnerIntegrity( |
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TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
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TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for inner wrap |
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UINT16 dataSize, // IN: the size of sensitive data, excluding the |
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// leading integrity buffer size |
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BYTE *innerBuffer // IN/OUT: inner buffer with sensitive data in |
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// it. At input, the leading bytes of this |
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// buffer is reserved for integrity |
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) |
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{ |
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BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
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TPM2B_DIGEST integrity; |
|
UINT16 integritySize; |
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BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer |
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INT32 bufferSize; |
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// sensitiveData points to the beginning of sensitive data in innerBuffer |
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integritySize = sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg); |
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sensitiveData = innerBuffer + integritySize; |
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ComputeInnerIntegrity(hashAlg, name, dataSize, sensitiveData, &integrity); |
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// Add integrity at the beginning of inner buffer |
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buffer = innerBuffer; |
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bufferSize = sizeof(TPM2B_DIGEST); |
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TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(&integrity, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
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return dataSize + integritySize; |
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} |
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// |
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// |
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// CheckInnerIntegrity() |
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// |
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// This function check integrity of inner blob |
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// |
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// Error Returns Meaning |
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// |
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// TPM_RC_INTEGRITY if the outer blob integrity is bad |
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// unmarshal errors unmarshal errors while unmarshaling integrity |
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// |
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static TPM_RC |
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CheckInnerIntegrity( |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
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TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for inner wrap |
|
UINT16 dataSize, // IN: the size of sensitive data, including the |
|
// leading integrity buffer size |
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BYTE *innerBuffer // IN/OUT: inner buffer with sensitive data in |
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// it |
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) |
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{ |
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TPM_RC result; |
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TPM2B_DIGEST integrity; |
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TPM2B_DIGEST integrityToCompare; |
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BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer |
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INT32 size; |
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// Unmarshal integrity |
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buffer = innerBuffer; |
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size = (INT32) dataSize; |
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result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(&integrity, &buffer, &size); |
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if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
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{ |
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// Compute integrity to compare |
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ComputeInnerIntegrity(hashAlg, name, (UINT16) size, buffer, |
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&integrityToCompare); |
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// Compare outer blob integrity |
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if(!Memory2BEqual(&integrity.b, &integrityToCompare.b)) |
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result = TPM_RC_INTEGRITY; |
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} |
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return result; |
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} |
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// |
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// |
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// Public Functions |
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// |
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// AreAttributesForParent() |
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// |
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// This function is called by create, load, and import functions. |
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// |
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// Return Value Meaning |
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// |
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// TRUE properties are those of a parent |
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// FALSE properties are not those of a parent |
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// |
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BOOL |
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AreAttributesForParent( |
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OBJECT *parentObject // IN: parent handle |
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) |
|
{ |
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// This function is only called when a parent is needed. Any |
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// time a "parent" is used, it must be authorized. When |
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// the authorization is checked, both the public and sensitive |
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// areas must be loaded. Just make sure... |
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pAssert(parentObject->attributes.publicOnly == CLEAR); |
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if(ObjectDataIsStorage(&parentObject->publicArea)) |
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return TRUE; |
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else |
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return FALSE; |
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} |
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// |
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// |
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// SchemeChecks() |
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// |
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// This function validates the schemes in the public area of an object. This function is called by |
|
// TPM2_LoadExternal() and PublicAttributesValidation(). |
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// |
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// Error Returns Meaning |
|
// |
|
// TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different public |
|
// parameters |
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// TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES attempt to inject sensitive data for an asymmetric key; or attempt to |
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// create a symmetric cipher key that is not a decryption key |
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// TPM_RC_HASH non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different name |
|
// algorithm |
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// TPM_RC_KDF incorrect KDF specified for decrypting keyed hash object |
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// TPM_RC_KEY invalid key size values in an asymmetric key public area |
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// TPM_RC_SCHEME inconsistent attributes decrypt, sign, restricted and key's scheme ID; |
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// or hash algorithm is inconsistent with the scheme ID for keyed hash |
|
// object |
|
// TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC a storage key with no symmetric algorithm specified; or non-storage |
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// key with symmetric algorithm different from TPM_ALG_NULL |
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// TPM_RC_TYPE unexpected object type; or non-duplicable storage key and its parent |
|
// have different types |
|
// |
|
TPM_RC |
|
SchemeChecks( |
|
BOOL load, // IN: TRUE if load checks, FALSE if |
|
// TPM2_Create() |
|
TPMI_DH_OBJECT parentHandle, // IN: input parent handle |
|
TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea // IN: public area of the object |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
// Checks for an asymmetric key |
|
if(CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(publicArea->type)) |
|
{ |
|
TPMT_ASYM_SCHEME *keyScheme; |
|
keyScheme = &publicArea->parameters.asymDetail.scheme; |
|
// An asymmetric key can't be injected |
|
// This is only checked when creating an object |
|
if(!load && (publicArea->objectAttributes.sensitiveDataOrigin == CLEAR)) |
|
return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES; |
|
if(load && !CryptAreKeySizesConsistent(publicArea)) |
|
return TPM_RC_KEY; |
|
// Keys that are both signing and decrypting must have TPM_ALG_NULL |
|
// for scheme |
|
if( publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET |
|
&& publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET |
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&& keyScheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
// A restrict sign key must have a non-NULL scheme |
|
if( publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET |
|
&& publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET |
|
&& keyScheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
// Keys must have a valid sign or decrypt scheme, or a TPM_ALG_NULL |
|
// scheme |
|
// NOTE: The unmarshaling for a public area will unmarshal based on the |
|
// object type. If the type is an RSA key, then only RSA schemes will be |
|
// allowed because a TPMI_ALG_RSA_SCHEME will be unmarshaled and it |
|
// consists only of those algorithms that are allowed with an RSA key. |
|
// This means that there is no need to again make sure that the algorithm |
|
// is compatible with the object type. |
|
if( keyScheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL |
|
&& ( ( publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET |
|
&& !CryptIsSignScheme(keyScheme->scheme) |
|
) |
|
|| ( publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET |
|
&& !CryptIsDecryptScheme(keyScheme->scheme) |
|
) |
|
) |
|
) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
// Special checks for an ECC key |
|
#ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC |
|
if(publicArea->type == TPM_ALG_ECC) |
|
{ |
|
TPM_ECC_CURVE curveID = publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.curveID; |
|
const TPMT_ECC_SCHEME *curveScheme = CryptGetCurveSignScheme(curveID); |
|
// The curveId must be valid or the unmarshaling is busted. |
|
pAssert(curveScheme != NULL); |
|
// If the curveID requires a specific scheme, then the key must select |
|
// the same scheme |
|
if(curveScheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
{ |
|
if(keyScheme->scheme != curveScheme->scheme) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
// The scheme can allow any hash, or not... |
|
if( curveScheme->details.anySig.hashAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL |
|
&& ( keyScheme->details.anySig.hashAlg |
|
!= curveScheme->details.anySig.hashAlg |
|
) |
|
) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
} |
|
// For now, the KDF must be TPM_ALG_NULL |
|
if(publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.kdf.scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_KDF; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
// Checks for a storage key (restricted + decryption) |
|
if( publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET |
|
&& publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET) |
|
{ |
|
// A storage key must have a valid protection key |
|
if( publicArea->parameters.asymDetail.symmetric.algorithm |
|
== TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC; |
|
// A storage key must have a null scheme |
|
if(publicArea->parameters.asymDetail.scheme.scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
// A storage key must match its parent algorithms unless |
|
// it is duplicable or a primary (including Temporary Primary Objects) |
|
if( HandleGetType(parentHandle) != TPM_HT_PERMANENT |
|
&& publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedParent == SET |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
// If the object to be created is a storage key, and is fixedParent, |
|
// its crypto set has to match its parent's crypto set. TPM_RC_TYPE, |
|
// TPM_RC_HASH or TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC may be returned at this point |
|
return EqualCryptSet(publicArea, |
|
&(ObjectGet(parentHandle)->publicArea)); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
// Non-storage keys must have TPM_ALG_NULL for the symmetric algorithm |
|
if( publicArea->parameters.asymDetail.symmetric.algorithm |
|
!= TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC; |
|
}// End of asymmetric decryption key checks |
|
} // End of asymmetric checks |
|
// Check for bit attributes |
|
else if(publicArea->type == TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH) |
|
{ |
|
TPMT_KEYEDHASH_SCHEME *scheme |
|
= &publicArea->parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme; |
|
// If both sign and decrypt are set the scheme must be TPM_ALG_NULL |
|
// and the scheme selected when the key is used. |
|
// If neither sign nor decrypt is set, the scheme must be TPM_ALG_NULL |
|
// because this is a data object. |
|
if( publicArea->objectAttributes.sign |
|
== publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt) |
|
{ |
|
if(scheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS; |
|
} |
|
// If this is a decryption key, make sure that is is XOR and that there |
|
// is a KDF |
|
else if(publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt) |
|
{ |
|
if( scheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_XOR |
|
|| scheme->details.xor_.hashAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
if(scheme->details.xor_.kdf == TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_KDF; |
|
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS; |
|
} |
|
// only supported signing scheme for keyedHash object is HMAC |
|
if( scheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_HMAC |
|
|| scheme->details.hmac.hashAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_SCHEME; |
|
// end of the checks for keyedHash |
|
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS; |
|
} |
|
else if (publicArea->type == TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER) |
|
{ |
|
// Must be a decrypting key and may not be a signing key |
|
if( publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == CLEAR |
|
|| publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET |
|
) |
|
return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES; |
|
} |
|
else |
|
return TPM_RC_TYPE; |
|
return TPM_RC_SUCCESS; |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// PublicAttributesValidation() |
|
// |
|
// This function validates the values in the public area of an object. This function is called by |
|
// TPM2_Create(), TPM2_Load(), and TPM2_CreatePrimary() |
|
// |
|
// Error Returns Meaning |
|
// |
|
// TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different public |
|
// parameters |
|
// TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES fixedTPM, fixedParent, or encryptedDuplication attributes are |
|
// inconsistent between themselves or with those of the parent object; |
|
// inconsistent restricted, decrypt and sign attributes; attempt to inject |
|
// sensitive data for an asymmetric key; attempt to create a symmetric |
|
// cipher key that is not a decryption key |
|
// TPM_RC_HASH non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different name |
|
// algorithm |
|
// TPM_RC_KDF incorrect KDF specified for decrypting keyed hash object |
|
// TPM_RC_KEY invalid key size values in an asymmetric key public area |
|
// TPM_RC_SCHEME inconsistent attributes decrypt, sign, restricted and key's scheme ID; |
|
// or hash algorithm is inconsistent with the scheme ID for keyed hash |
|
// object |
|
// TPM_RC_SIZE authPolicy size does not match digest size of the name algorithm in |
|
// publicArea |
|
// TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC a storage key with no symmetric algorithm specified; or non-storage |
|
// key with symmetric algorithm different from TPM_ALG_NULL |
|
// TPM_RC_TYPE unexpected object type; or non-duplicable storage key and its parent |
|
// have different types |
|
// |
|
TPM_RC |
|
PublicAttributesValidation( |
|
BOOL load, // IN: TRUE if load checks, FALSE if |
|
// TPM2_Create() |
|
TPMI_DH_OBJECT parentHandle, // IN: input parent handle |
|
TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea // IN: public area of the object |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
OBJECT *parentObject = NULL; |
|
if(HandleGetType(parentHandle) != TPM_HT_PERMANENT) |
|
parentObject = ObjectGet(parentHandle); |
|
if (publicArea->nameAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
return TPM_RC_HASH; |
|
// Check authPolicy digest consistency |
|
if( publicArea->authPolicy.t.size != 0 |
|
&& ( publicArea->authPolicy.t.size |
|
!= CryptGetHashDigestSize(publicArea->nameAlg) |
|
) |
|
) |
|
return TPM_RC_SIZE; |
|
// If the parent is fixedTPM (including a Primary Object) the object must have |
|
// the same value for fixedTPM and fixedParent |
|
if( parentObject == NULL |
|
|| parentObject->publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedTPM == SET) |
|
{ |
|
if( publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedParent |
|
!= publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedTPM |
|
) |
|
return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES; |
|
} |
|
else |
|
// The parent is not fixedTPM so the object can't be fixedTPM |
|
if(publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedTPM == SET) |
|
return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES; |
|
// A restricted object cannot be both sign and decrypt and it can't be neither |
|
// sign nor decrypt |
|
if ( publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET |
|
&& ( publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt |
|
== publicArea->objectAttributes.sign) |
|
) |
|
return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES; |
|
// A fixedTPM object can not have encryptedDuplication bit SET |
|
if( publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedTPM == SET |
|
&& publicArea->objectAttributes.encryptedDuplication == SET) |
|
return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES; |
|
// If a parent object has fixedTPM CLEAR, the child must have the |
|
// same encryptedDuplication value as its parent. |
|
// Primary objects are considered to have a fixedTPM parent (the seeds). |
|
if( ( parentObject != NULL |
|
&& parentObject->publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedTPM == CLEAR) |
|
// Get here if parent is not fixed TPM |
|
&& ( publicArea->objectAttributes.encryptedDuplication |
|
!= parentObject->publicArea.objectAttributes.encryptedDuplication |
|
) |
|
) |
|
return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES; |
|
return SchemeChecks(load, parentHandle, publicArea); |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// FillInCreationData() |
|
// |
|
// Fill in creation data for an object. |
|
// |
|
void |
|
FillInCreationData( |
|
TPMI_DH_OBJECT parentHandle, // IN: handle of parent |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH nameHashAlg, // IN: name hash algorithm |
|
TPML_PCR_SELECTION *creationPCR, // IN: PCR selection |
|
TPM2B_DATA *outsideData, // IN: outside data |
|
TPM2B_CREATION_DATA *outCreation, // OUT: creation data for output |
|
TPM2B_DIGEST *creationDigest // OUT: creation digest |
|
// |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
BYTE creationBuffer[sizeof(TPMS_CREATION_DATA)]; |
|
BYTE *buffer; |
|
INT32 bufferSize; |
|
HASH_STATE hashState; |
|
// Fill in TPMS_CREATION_DATA in outCreation |
|
// Compute PCR digest |
|
PCRComputeCurrentDigest(nameHashAlg, creationPCR, |
|
&outCreation->t.creationData.pcrDigest); |
|
// Put back PCR selection list |
|
outCreation->t.creationData.pcrSelect = *creationPCR; |
|
// Get locality |
|
outCreation->t.creationData.locality |
|
= LocalityGetAttributes(_plat__LocalityGet()); |
|
outCreation->t.creationData.parentNameAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL; |
|
// If the parent is is either a primary seed or TPM_ALG_NULL, then the Name |
|
// and QN of the parent are the parent's handle. |
|
if(HandleGetType(parentHandle) == TPM_HT_PERMANENT) |
|
{ |
|
BYTE *buffer = &outCreation->t.creationData.parentName.t.name[0]; |
|
INT32 bufferSize = sizeof(TPM_HANDLE); |
|
outCreation->t.creationData.parentName.t.size = |
|
TPM_HANDLE_Marshal(&parentHandle, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// Parent qualified name of a Temporary Object is the same as parent's |
|
// name |
|
MemoryCopy2B(&outCreation->t.creationData.parentQualifiedName.b, |
|
&outCreation->t.creationData.parentName.b, |
|
sizeof(outCreation->t.creationData.parentQualifiedName.t.name)); |
|
} |
|
else // Regular object |
|
{ |
|
OBJECT *parentObject = ObjectGet(parentHandle); |
|
// Set name algorithm |
|
outCreation->t.creationData.parentNameAlg = |
|
parentObject->publicArea.nameAlg; |
|
// Copy parent name |
|
outCreation->t.creationData.parentName = parentObject->name; |
|
// Copy parent qualified name |
|
outCreation->t.creationData.parentQualifiedName = |
|
parentObject->qualifiedName; |
|
} |
|
// Copy outside information |
|
outCreation->t.creationData.outsideInfo = *outsideData; |
|
// Marshal creation data to canonical form |
|
buffer = creationBuffer; |
|
bufferSize = sizeof(TPMS_CREATION_DATA); |
|
outCreation->t.size = TPMS_CREATION_DATA_Marshal(&outCreation->t.creationData, |
|
&buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// Compute hash for creation field in public template |
|
creationDigest->t.size = CryptStartHash(nameHashAlg, &hashState); |
|
CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, outCreation->t.size, creationBuffer); |
|
CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &creationDigest->b); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
// GetSeedForKDF() |
|
// |
|
// Get a seed for KDF. The KDF for encryption and HMAC key use the same seed. It returns a pointer to |
|
// the seed |
|
// |
|
TPM2B_SEED* |
|
GetSeedForKDF( |
|
TPM_HANDLE protectorHandle, // IN: the protector handle |
|
TPM2B_SEED *seedIn // IN: the optional input seed |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
OBJECT *protector = NULL; // Pointer to the protector |
|
// Get seed for encryption key. Use input seed if provided. |
|
// Otherwise, using protector object's seedValue. TPM_RH_NULL is the only |
|
// exception that we may not have a loaded object as protector. In such a |
|
// case, use nullProof as seed. |
|
if(seedIn != NULL) |
|
{ |
|
return seedIn; |
|
} |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
if(protectorHandle == TPM_RH_NULL) |
|
{ |
|
return (TPM2B_SEED *) &gr.nullProof; |
|
} |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
protector = ObjectGet(protectorHandle); |
|
return (TPM2B_SEED *) &protector->sensitive.seedValue; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// ProduceOuterWrap() |
|
// |
|
// This function produce outer wrap for a buffer containing the sensitive data. It requires the sensitive data |
|
// being marshaled to the outerBuffer, with the leading bytes reserved for integrity hash. If iv is used, iv |
|
// space should be reserved at the beginning of the buffer. It assumes the sensitive data starts at address |
|
// (outerBuffer + integrity size {+ iv size}). This function performs: |
|
// a) Add IV before sensitive area if required |
|
// b) encrypt sensitive data, if iv is required, encrypt by iv. otherwise, encrypted by a NULL iv |
|
// c) add HMAC integrity at the beginning of the buffer It returns the total size of blob with outer wrap |
|
// |
|
UINT16 |
|
ProduceOuterWrap( |
|
TPM_HANDLE protector, // IN: The handle of the object that provides |
|
// protection. For object, it is parent |
|
// handle. For credential, it is the handle |
|
// of encrypt object. |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
|
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for outer wrap |
|
TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed may be provided for |
|
// duplication blob. For non duplication |
|
// blob, this parameter should be NULL |
|
BOOL useIV, // IN: indicate if an IV is used |
|
UINT16 dataSize, // IN: the size of sensitive data, excluding the |
|
// leading integrity buffer size or the |
|
// optional iv size |
|
BYTE *outerBuffer // IN/OUT: outer buffer with sensitive data in |
|
// it |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
TPM_ALG_ID symAlg; |
|
UINT16 keyBits; |
|
TPM2B_SYM_KEY symKey; |
|
TPM2B_IV ivRNG; // IV from RNG |
|
TPM2B_IV *iv = NULL; |
|
UINT16 ivSize = 0; // size of iv area, including the size field |
|
BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
|
TPM2B_DIGEST integrity; |
|
UINT16 integritySize; |
|
BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer |
|
INT32 bufferSize; |
|
// Compute the beginning of sensitive data. The outer integrity should |
|
// always exist if this function function is called to make an outer wrap |
|
integritySize = sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg); |
|
sensitiveData = outerBuffer + integritySize; |
|
// If iv is used, adjust the pointer of sensitive data and add iv before it |
|
if(useIV) |
|
{ |
|
ivSize = GetIV2BSize(protector); |
|
// Generate IV from RNG. The iv data size should be the total IV area |
|
// size minus the size of size field |
|
ivRNG.t.size = ivSize - sizeof(UINT16); |
|
CryptGenerateRandom(ivRNG.t.size, ivRNG.t.buffer); |
|
// Marshal IV to buffer |
|
buffer = sensitiveData; |
|
bufferSize = sizeof(TPM2B_IV); |
|
TPM2B_IV_Marshal(&ivRNG, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// adjust sensitive data starting after IV area |
|
sensitiveData += ivSize; |
|
// Use iv for encryption |
|
iv = &ivRNG; |
|
} |
|
// Compute symmetric key parameters for outer buffer encryption |
|
ComputeProtectionKeyParms(protector, hashAlg, name, seed, |
|
&symAlg, &keyBits, &symKey); |
|
// Encrypt inner buffer in place |
|
CryptSymmetricEncrypt(sensitiveData, symAlg, keyBits, |
|
TPM_ALG_CFB, symKey.t.buffer, iv, dataSize, |
|
sensitiveData); |
|
// Compute outer integrity. Integrity computation includes the optional IV |
|
// area |
|
ComputeOuterIntegrity(name, protector, hashAlg, seed, dataSize + ivSize, |
|
outerBuffer + integritySize, &integrity); |
|
// Add integrity at the beginning of outer buffer |
|
buffer = outerBuffer; |
|
bufferSize = sizeof(TPM2B_DIGEST); |
|
TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(&integrity, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// return the total size in outer wrap |
|
return dataSize + integritySize + ivSize; |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// UnwrapOuter() |
|
// |
|
// This function remove the outer wrap of a blob containing sensitive data This function performs: |
|
// a) check integrity of outer blob |
|
// b) decrypt outer blob |
|
// |
|
// Error Returns Meaning |
|
// |
|
// TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT error during sensitive data unmarshaling |
|
// TPM_RC_INTEGRITY sensitive data integrity is broken |
|
// TPM_RC_SIZE error during sensitive data unmarshaling |
|
// TPM_RC_VALUE IV size for CFB does not match the encryption algorithm block size |
|
// |
|
TPM_RC |
|
UnwrapOuter( |
|
TPM_HANDLE protector, // IN: The handle of the object that provides |
|
// protection. For object, it is parent |
|
// handle. For credential, it is the handle |
|
// of encrypt object. |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
|
TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for outer wrap |
|
TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed may be provided for |
|
// duplication blob. For non duplication |
|
// blob, this parameter should be NULL. |
|
BOOL useIV, // IN: indicates if an IV is used |
|
UINT16 dataSize, // IN: size of sensitive data in outerBuffer, |
|
// including the leading integrity buffer |
|
// size, and an optional iv area |
|
BYTE *outerBuffer // IN/OUT: sensitive data |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
TPM_RC result; |
|
TPM_ALG_ID symAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL; |
|
TPM2B_SYM_KEY symKey; |
|
UINT16 keyBits = 0; |
|
TPM2B_IV ivIn; // input IV retrieved from input buffer |
|
TPM2B_IV *iv = NULL; |
|
BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
|
TPM2B_DIGEST integrityToCompare; |
|
TPM2B_DIGEST integrity; |
|
INT32 size; |
|
// Unmarshal integrity |
|
sensitiveData = outerBuffer; |
|
size = (INT32) dataSize; |
|
result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(&integrity, &sensitiveData, &size); |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
{ |
|
// Compute integrity to compare |
|
ComputeOuterIntegrity(name, protector, hashAlg, seed, |
|
(UINT16) size, sensitiveData, |
|
&integrityToCompare); |
|
// Compare outer blob integrity |
|
if(!Memory2BEqual(&integrity.b, &integrityToCompare.b)) |
|
return TPM_RC_INTEGRITY; |
|
// Get the symmetric algorithm parameters used for encryption |
|
ComputeProtectionKeyParms(protector, hashAlg, name, seed, |
|
&symAlg, &keyBits, &symKey); |
|
// Retrieve IV if it is used |
|
if(useIV) |
|
{ |
|
result = TPM2B_IV_Unmarshal(&ivIn, &sensitiveData, &size); |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
{ |
|
// The input iv size for CFB must match the encryption algorithm |
|
// block size |
|
if(ivIn.t.size != CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(symAlg, keyBits)) |
|
result = TPM_RC_VALUE; |
|
else |
|
iv = &ivIn; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
// If no errors, decrypt private in place |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
CryptSymmetricDecrypt(sensitiveData, symAlg, keyBits, |
|
TPM_ALG_CFB, symKey.t.buffer, iv, |
|
(UINT16) size, sensitiveData); |
|
return result; |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// SensitiveToPrivate() |
|
// |
|
// This function prepare the private blob for off the chip storage The operations in this function: |
|
// a) marshal TPM2B_SENSITIVE structure into the buffer of TPM2B_PRIVATE |
|
// b) apply encryption to the sensitive area. |
|
// c) apply outer integrity computation. |
|
// |
|
void |
|
SensitiveToPrivate( |
|
TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // IN: sensitive structure |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
|
TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: The parent's handle |
|
TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: hash algorithm in public area. This |
|
// parameter is used when parentHandle is |
|
// NULL, in which case the object is |
|
// temporary. |
|
TPM2B_PRIVATE *outPrivate // OUT: output private structure |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer |
|
INT32 bufferSize; |
|
BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
|
UINT16 dataSize; // data blob size |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg; // hash algorithm for integrity |
|
UINT16 integritySize; |
|
UINT16 ivSize; |
|
pAssert(name != NULL && name->t.size != 0); |
|
// Find the hash algorithm for integrity computation |
|
if(parentHandle == TPM_RH_NULL) |
|
{ |
|
// For Temporary Object, using self name algorithm |
|
hashAlg = nameAlg; |
|
} |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
// Otherwise, using parent's name algorithm |
|
hashAlg = ObjectGetNameAlg(parentHandle); |
|
} |
|
// Starting of sensitive data without wrappers |
|
sensitiveData = outPrivate->t.buffer; |
|
// Compute the integrity size |
|
integritySize = sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg); |
|
// Reserve space for integrity |
|
sensitiveData += integritySize; |
|
// Get iv size |
|
ivSize = GetIV2BSize(parentHandle); |
|
// Reserve space for iv |
|
sensitiveData += ivSize; |
|
// Marshal sensitive area, leaving the leading 2 bytes for size |
|
buffer = sensitiveData + sizeof(UINT16); |
|
bufferSize = sizeof(TPMT_SENSITIVE); |
|
dataSize = TPMT_SENSITIVE_Marshal(sensitive, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// Adding size before the data area |
|
buffer = sensitiveData; |
|
bufferSize = sizeof(UINT16); |
|
UINT16_Marshal(&dataSize, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// Adjust the dataSize to include the size field |
|
dataSize += sizeof(UINT16); |
|
// Adjust the pointer to inner buffer including the iv |
|
sensitiveData = outPrivate->t.buffer + ivSize; |
|
//Produce outer wrap, including encryption and HMAC |
|
outPrivate->t.size = ProduceOuterWrap(parentHandle, name, hashAlg, NULL, |
|
TRUE, dataSize, outPrivate->t.buffer); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// PrivateToSensitive() |
|
// |
|
// Unwrap a input private area. Check the integrity, decrypt and retrieve data to a sensitive structure. The |
|
// operations in this function: |
|
// a) check the integrity HMAC of the input private area |
|
// b) decrypt the private buffer |
|
// c) unmarshal TPMT_SENSITIVE structure into the buffer of TPMT_SENSITIVE |
|
// |
|
// Error Returns Meaning |
|
// |
|
// TPM_RC_INTEGRITY if the private area integrity is bad |
|
// TPM_RC_SENSITIVE unmarshal errors while unmarshaling TPMS_ENCRYPT from input |
|
// private |
|
// TPM_RC_VALUE outer wrapper does not have an iV of the correct size |
|
// |
|
TPM_RC |
|
PrivateToSensitive( |
|
TPM2B_PRIVATE *inPrivate, // IN: input private structure |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
|
TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: The parent's handle |
|
TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: hash algorithm in public area. It is |
|
// passed separately because we only pass |
|
// name, rather than the whole public area |
|
// of the object. This parameter is used in |
|
// the following two cases: 1. primary |
|
// objects. 2. duplication blob with inner |
|
// wrap. In other cases, this parameter |
|
// will be ignored |
|
TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive // OUT: sensitive structure |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
TPM_RC result; |
|
BYTE *buffer; |
|
INT32 size; |
|
BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
|
UINT16 dataSize; |
|
UINT16 dataSizeInput; |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg; // hash algorithm for integrity |
|
OBJECT *parent = NULL; |
|
UINT16 integritySize; |
|
UINT16 ivSize; |
|
// Make sure that name is provided |
|
pAssert(name != NULL && name->t.size != 0); |
|
// Find the hash algorithm for integrity computation |
|
if(parentHandle == TPM_RH_NULL) |
|
{ |
|
// For Temporary Object, using self name algorithm |
|
hashAlg = nameAlg; |
|
} |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
// Otherwise, using parent's name algorithm |
|
hashAlg = ObjectGetNameAlg(parentHandle); |
|
} |
|
// unwrap outer |
|
result = UnwrapOuter(parentHandle, name, hashAlg, NULL, TRUE, |
|
inPrivate->t.size, inPrivate->t.buffer); |
|
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
return result; |
|
// Compute the inner integrity size. |
|
integritySize = sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg); |
|
// Get iv size |
|
ivSize = GetIV2BSize(parentHandle); |
|
// The starting of sensitive data and data size without outer wrapper |
|
sensitiveData = inPrivate->t.buffer + integritySize + ivSize; |
|
dataSize = inPrivate->t.size - integritySize - ivSize; |
|
// Unmarshal input data size |
|
buffer = sensitiveData; |
|
size = (INT32) dataSize; |
|
result = UINT16_Unmarshal(&dataSizeInput, &buffer, &size); |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
{ |
|
if((dataSizeInput + sizeof(UINT16)) != dataSize) |
|
result = TPM_RC_SENSITIVE; |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
// Unmarshal sensitive buffer to sensitive structure |
|
result = TPMT_SENSITIVE_Unmarshal(sensitive, &buffer, &size); |
|
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS || size != 0) |
|
{ |
|
pAssert( (parent == NULL) |
|
|| parent->publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedTPM == CLEAR); |
|
result = TPM_RC_SENSITIVE; |
|
} |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
// Always remove trailing zeros at load so that it is not necessary |
|
// to check |
|
// each time auth is checked. |
|
MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&(sensitive->authValue)); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return result; |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// SensitiveToDuplicate() |
|
// |
|
// This function prepare the duplication blob from the sensitive area. The operations in this function: |
|
// a) marshal TPMT_SENSITIVE structure into the buffer of TPM2B_PRIVATE |
|
// b) apply inner wrap to the sensitive area if required |
|
// c) apply outer wrap if required |
|
// |
|
void |
|
SensitiveToDuplicate( |
|
TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // IN: sensitive structure |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
|
TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: The new parent's handle |
|
TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: hash algorithm in public area. It |
|
// is passed separately because we |
|
// only pass name, rather than the |
|
// whole public area of the object. |
|
TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: the external seed. If external |
|
// seed is provided with size of 0, |
|
// no outer wrap should be applied |
|
// to duplication blob. |
|
TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *symDef, // IN: Symmetric key definition. If the |
|
// symmetric key algorithm is NULL, |
|
// no inner wrap should be applied. |
|
TPM2B_DATA *innerSymKey, // IN/OUT: a symmetric key may be |
|
// provided to encrypt the inner |
|
// wrap of a duplication blob. May |
|
// be generated here if needed. |
|
TPM2B_PRIVATE *outPrivate // OUT: output private structure |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer |
|
INT32 bufferSize; |
|
BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH outerHash = TPM_ALG_NULL;// The hash algorithm for outer wrap |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH innerHash = TPM_ALG_NULL;// The hash algorithm for inner wrap |
|
UINT16 dataSize; // data blob size |
|
BOOL doInnerWrap = FALSE; |
|
BOOL doOuterWrap = FALSE; |
|
// Make sure that name is provided |
|
pAssert(name != NULL && name->t.size != 0); |
|
// Make sure symDef and innerSymKey are not NULL |
|
pAssert(symDef != NULL && innerSymKey != NULL); |
|
// Starting of sensitive data without wrappers |
|
sensitiveData = outPrivate->t.buffer; |
|
// Find out if inner wrap is required |
|
if(symDef->algorithm != TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
{ |
|
doInnerWrap = TRUE; |
|
// Use self nameAlg as inner hash algorithm |
|
innerHash = nameAlg; |
|
// Adjust sensitive data pointer |
|
sensitiveData += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(innerHash); |
|
} |
|
// Find out if outer wrap is required |
|
if(seed->t.size != 0) |
|
{ |
|
doOuterWrap = TRUE; |
|
// Use parent nameAlg as outer hash algorithm |
|
outerHash = ObjectGetNameAlg(parentHandle); |
|
// Adjust sensitive data pointer |
|
sensitiveData += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash); |
|
} |
|
// Marshal sensitive area, leaving the leading 2 bytes for size |
|
buffer = sensitiveData + sizeof(UINT16); |
|
bufferSize = sizeof(TPMT_SENSITIVE); |
|
dataSize = TPMT_SENSITIVE_Marshal(sensitive, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// Adding size before the data area |
|
buffer = sensitiveData; |
|
bufferSize = sizeof(UINT16); |
|
UINT16_Marshal(&dataSize, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// Adjust the dataSize to include the size field |
|
dataSize += sizeof(UINT16); |
|
// Apply inner wrap for duplication blob. It includes both integrity and |
|
// encryption |
|
if(doInnerWrap) |
|
{ |
|
BYTE *innerBuffer = NULL; |
|
BOOL symKeyInput = TRUE; |
|
innerBuffer = outPrivate->t.buffer; |
|
// Skip outer integrity space |
|
if(doOuterWrap) |
|
innerBuffer += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash); |
|
dataSize = ProduceInnerIntegrity(name, innerHash, dataSize, |
|
innerBuffer); |
|
// Generate inner encryption key if needed |
|
if(innerSymKey->t.size == 0) |
|
{ |
|
innerSymKey->t.size = (symDef->keyBits.sym + 7) / 8; |
|
CryptGenerateRandom(innerSymKey->t.size, innerSymKey->t.buffer); |
|
// TPM generates symmetric encryption. Set the flag to FALSE |
|
symKeyInput = FALSE; |
|
} |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
// assume the input key size should matches the symmetric definition |
|
pAssert(innerSymKey->t.size == (symDef->keyBits.sym + 7) / 8); |
|
} |
|
// Encrypt inner buffer in place |
|
CryptSymmetricEncrypt(innerBuffer, symDef->algorithm, |
|
symDef->keyBits.sym, TPM_ALG_CFB, |
|
innerSymKey->t.buffer, NULL, dataSize, |
|
innerBuffer); |
|
// If the symmetric encryption key is imported, clear the buffer for |
|
// output |
|
if(symKeyInput) |
|
innerSymKey->t.size = 0; |
|
} |
|
// Apply outer wrap for duplication blob. It includes both integrity and |
|
// encryption |
|
if(doOuterWrap) |
|
{ |
|
dataSize = ProduceOuterWrap(parentHandle, name, outerHash, seed, FALSE, |
|
dataSize, outPrivate->t.buffer); |
|
} |
|
// Data size for output |
|
outPrivate->t.size = dataSize; |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// DuplicateToSensitive() |
|
// |
|
// Unwrap a duplication blob. Check the integrity, decrypt and retrieve data to a sensitive structure. The |
|
// operations in this function: |
|
// a) check the integrity HMAC of the input private area |
|
// b) decrypt the private buffer |
|
// c) unmarshal TPMT_SENSITIVE structure into the buffer of TPMT_SENSITIVE |
|
// |
|
// Error Returns Meaning |
|
// |
|
// TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT unmarshaling sensitive data from inPrivate failed |
|
// TPM_RC_INTEGRITY inPrivate data integrity is broken |
|
// TPM_RC_SIZE unmarshaling sensitive data from inPrivate failed |
|
// |
|
TPM_RC |
|
DuplicateToSensitive( |
|
TPM2B_PRIVATE *inPrivate, // IN: input private structure |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
|
TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: The parent's handle |
|
TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: hash algorithm in public area. |
|
TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed may be provided. |
|
// If external seed is provided with |
|
// size of 0, no outer wrap is |
|
// applied |
|
TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *symDef, // IN: Symmetric key definition. If the |
|
// symmetric key algorithm is NULL, |
|
// no inner wrap is applied |
|
TPM2B_DATA *innerSymKey, // IN: a symmetric key may be provided |
|
// to decrypt the inner wrap of a |
|
// duplication blob. |
|
TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive // OUT: sensitive structure |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
TPM_RC result; |
|
BYTE *buffer; |
|
INT32 size; |
|
BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
|
UINT16 dataSize; |
|
UINT16 dataSizeInput; |
|
// Make sure that name is provided |
|
pAssert(name != NULL && name->t.size != 0); |
|
// Make sure symDef and innerSymKey are not NULL |
|
pAssert(symDef != NULL && innerSymKey != NULL); |
|
// Starting of sensitive data |
|
sensitiveData = inPrivate->t.buffer; |
|
dataSize = inPrivate->t.size; |
|
// Find out if outer wrap is applied |
|
if(seed->t.size != 0) |
|
{ |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH outerHash = TPM_ALG_NULL; |
|
// Use parent nameAlg as outer hash algorithm |
|
outerHash = ObjectGetNameAlg(parentHandle); |
|
result = UnwrapOuter(parentHandle, name, outerHash, seed, FALSE, |
|
dataSize, sensitiveData); |
|
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
return result; |
|
// Adjust sensitive data pointer and size |
|
sensitiveData += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash); |
|
dataSize -= sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash); |
|
} |
|
// Find out if inner wrap is applied |
|
if(symDef->algorithm != TPM_ALG_NULL) |
|
{ |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH innerHash = TPM_ALG_NULL; |
|
// assume the input key size should matches the symmetric definition |
|
pAssert(innerSymKey->t.size == (symDef->keyBits.sym + 7) / 8); |
|
// Decrypt inner buffer in place |
|
CryptSymmetricDecrypt(sensitiveData, symDef->algorithm, |
|
symDef->keyBits.sym, TPM_ALG_CFB, |
|
innerSymKey->t.buffer, NULL, dataSize, |
|
sensitiveData); |
|
// Use self nameAlg as inner hash algorithm |
|
innerHash = nameAlg; |
|
// Check inner integrity |
|
result = CheckInnerIntegrity(name, innerHash, dataSize, sensitiveData); |
|
if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
return result; |
|
// Adjust sensitive data pointer and size |
|
sensitiveData += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(innerHash); |
|
dataSize -= sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(innerHash); |
|
} |
|
// Unmarshal input data size |
|
buffer = sensitiveData; |
|
size = (INT32) dataSize; |
|
result = UINT16_Unmarshal(&dataSizeInput, &buffer, &size); |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
{ |
|
if((dataSizeInput + sizeof(UINT16)) != dataSize) |
|
result = TPM_RC_SIZE; |
|
else |
|
{ |
|
// Unmarshal sensitive buffer to sensitive structure |
|
result = TPMT_SENSITIVE_Unmarshal(sensitive, &buffer, &size); |
|
// if the results is OK make sure that all the data was unmarshaled |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS && size != 0) |
|
result = TPM_RC_SIZE; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
// Always remove trailing zeros at load so that it is not necessary to check |
|
// each time auth is checked. |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&(sensitive->authValue)); |
|
return result; |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// SecretToCredential() |
|
// |
|
// This function prepare the credential blob from a secret (a TPM2B_DIGEST) The operations in this |
|
// function: |
|
// a) marshal TPM2B_DIGEST structure into the buffer of TPM2B_ID_OBJECT |
|
// b) encrypt the private buffer, excluding the leading integrity HMAC area |
|
// c) compute integrity HMAC and append to the beginning of the buffer. |
|
// d) Set the total size of TPM2B_ID_OBJECT buffer |
|
// |
|
void |
|
SecretToCredential( |
|
TPM2B_DIGEST *secret, // IN: secret information |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
|
TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed. |
|
TPM_HANDLE protector, // IN: The protector's handle |
|
TPM2B_ID_OBJECT *outIDObject // OUT: output credential |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer |
|
INT32 bufferSize; |
|
BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH outerHash; // The hash algorithm for outer wrap |
|
UINT16 dataSize; // data blob size |
|
pAssert(secret != NULL && outIDObject != NULL); |
|
// use protector's name algorithm as outer hash |
|
outerHash = ObjectGetNameAlg(protector); |
|
// Marshal secret area to credential buffer, leave space for integrity |
|
sensitiveData = outIDObject->t.credential |
|
+ sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash); |
|
// Marshal secret area |
|
buffer = sensitiveData; |
|
bufferSize = sizeof(TPM2B_DIGEST); |
|
dataSize = TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(secret, &buffer, &bufferSize); |
|
// Apply outer wrap |
|
outIDObject->t.size = ProduceOuterWrap(protector, |
|
name, |
|
outerHash, |
|
seed, |
|
FALSE, |
|
dataSize, |
|
outIDObject->t.credential); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
// |
|
// |
|
// CredentialToSecret() |
|
// |
|
// Unwrap a credential. Check the integrity, decrypt and retrieve data to a TPM2B_DIGEST structure. The |
|
// operations in this function: |
|
// a) check the integrity HMAC of the input credential area |
|
// b) decrypt the credential buffer |
|
// c) unmarshal TPM2B_DIGEST structure into the buffer of TPM2B_DIGEST |
|
// |
|
// Error Returns Meaning |
|
// |
|
// TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT error during credential unmarshaling |
|
// TPM_RC_INTEGRITY credential integrity is broken |
|
// TPM_RC_SIZE error during credential unmarshaling |
|
// TPM_RC_VALUE IV size does not match the encryption algorithm block size |
|
// |
|
TPM_RC |
|
CredentialToSecret( |
|
TPM2B_ID_OBJECT *inIDObject, // IN: input credential blob |
|
TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object |
|
TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed. |
|
TPM_HANDLE protector, // IN: The protector's handle |
|
TPM2B_DIGEST *secret // OUT: secret information |
|
) |
|
{ |
|
TPM_RC result; |
|
BYTE *buffer; |
|
INT32 size; |
|
TPMI_ALG_HASH outerHash; // The hash algorithm for outer wrap |
|
BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data |
|
UINT16 dataSize; |
|
// use protector's name algorithm as outer hash |
|
outerHash = ObjectGetNameAlg(protector); |
|
// Unwrap outer, a TPM_RC_INTEGRITY error may be returned at this point |
|
result = UnwrapOuter(protector, name, outerHash, seed, FALSE, |
|
inIDObject->t.size, inIDObject->t.credential); |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) |
|
{ |
|
// Compute the beginning of sensitive data |
|
sensitiveData = inIDObject->t.credential |
|
+ sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash); |
|
dataSize = inIDObject->t.size |
|
- (sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash)); |
|
// Unmarshal secret buffer to TPM2B_DIGEST structure |
|
buffer = sensitiveData; |
|
size = (INT32) dataSize; |
|
result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(secret, &buffer, &size); |
|
// If there were no other unmarshaling errors, make sure that the |
|
// expected amount of data was recovered |
|
if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS && size != 0) |
|
return TPM_RC_SIZE; |
|
} |
|
return result; |
|
}
|
|
|