You can not select more than 25 topics
Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
108 lines
4.9 KiB
108 lines
4.9 KiB
### |
|
### Untrusted_app_all. |
|
### |
|
### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except |
|
### apps which target the v2 security sandbox (ephemeral_app for instant apps, |
|
### untrusted_v2_app for fully installed v2 apps). |
|
### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and |
|
### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID |
|
### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data |
|
### directory). The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default |
|
### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000) |
|
### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo |
|
### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this |
|
### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps |
|
### that are not signed by the platform key. To move |
|
### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to |
|
### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values |
|
### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and |
|
### seapp_contexts. |
|
### |
|
### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also |
|
### added to untrusted_v2_app.te and ephemeral_app.te. |
|
|
|
# Legacy text relocations |
|
allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod; |
|
|
|
# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out |
|
# to their sandbox directory and then execute. |
|
allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod }; |
|
|
|
# ASEC |
|
allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms; |
|
# Execute libs in asec containers. |
|
allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute execmod }; |
|
|
|
# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when |
|
# running "adb install foo.apk". |
|
# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files. |
|
# Figure out a way to remove these rules. |
|
allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; |
|
|
|
# Allow to read staged apks. |
|
allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr}; |
|
|
|
# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder. |
|
# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for |
|
# cropping or taking user photos. |
|
allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr }; |
|
|
|
# |
|
# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app. |
|
# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app. |
|
# |
|
|
|
# Access to /data/media. |
|
allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; |
|
|
|
# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon |
|
# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider |
|
allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search; |
|
|
|
# allow cts to query all services |
|
allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list; |
|
|
|
allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all mediacodec_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find; |
|
|
|
# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored |
|
# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all |
|
# data stored in that directory to process them one by one. |
|
userdebug_or_eng(` |
|
allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; |
|
') |
|
|
|
# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process. |
|
allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace; |
|
|
|
# Cts: HwRngTest |
|
allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms; |
|
|
|
# Allow apps to view preloaded media content |
|
allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search; |
|
|
|
# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can |
|
# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves. |
|
# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating a special type for /vendor/app installed |
|
# apps. |
|
allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search }; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { open getattr read execute }; |
|
allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read };
|
|
|